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Adolescence is often described as a period of heightened risk-taking. Adolescents are notorious 
for impulsivity, emotional volatility, and risky behaviors such as drinking and driving under the 
influence of alcohol. By contrast, we found that risk-taking declines linearly from childhood to 
adulthood when individuals make choices over monetary gambles. Further, with age we found 
increases in the sensitivity to economic risk, defined as the degree to which a preference for 
assured monetary gains over a risky payoff depends upon the variability in the risky payoff. 
These findings indicate that decisions about economic risk may follow a different developmental 
trajectory than other kinds of risk-taking, and that changes in sensitivity to risk may be a major 
factor in the development of mature risk aversion.
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IntroductIon
Imagine you are confronted with a choice between 
a sure $5 or a coin flip in which you could win $10 
or nothing. A rational decision-maker would be 
indifferent to these options because they have the 
same expected, or average, value ($5). Yet, most 
people prefer the sure bet, a phenomenon known 
as risk aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
A number of factors have been found to 
modulate risk aversion. For example, people tend 
to accept risks more often for smaller than for 
greater monetary rewards (Weber and Chapman, 
2005), more often for primary (juice) than sec-
ondary (money) rewards (Hayden and Platt, 
2008), and more often when offered multiple 
opportunities to wager than when offered only a 
single shot (Redelmeier and Tversky, 1992). The 
timing of gambles can also be a factor: risk-taking 
decreases when consecutive choices are spaced 
at longer temporal intervals (Hayden and Platt, 
2007). Some species display similar risk prefer-
ences and decision strategies, for example humans 
and macaques show win-stay and lose-shift strate-
gies for juice rewards (Hayden and Platt, 2008), 
while others, such as chimpanzees and bonobos, 
display risk-seeking, and risk-averse tendencies, 
respectively (Heilbronner et al., 2008).
Age is another factor modulating risk aver-
sion. Several studies have shown that risk aversion 
increases slowly between childhood and adult-
hood (Levin and Hart, 2003; Levin et al., 2007; 
Rakow and Rahim, 2010; Weller et al., 2010). 
Young children are more influenced than adults 
by the probability of winning (Harbaugh et al., 
2002), and more likely to take economic risks that 
are disadvantageous in the long run. Nonetheless, 
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they are also less likely to take risks that are advan-
tageous (Crone et al., 2008). Other studies have 
shown that adolescents are more likely than adults 
to be predisposed to take risks by changes in affect 
as well (Figner et al., 2009; Burnett et al., 2010). 
Thus, while aversion to risk appears to increase 
monotonically with age, modulating factors like 
emotional affect and probability can alter this 
general pattern.
In a recent article, we reported that risk aver-
sion increases both with age and with increas-
ing economic risk (Paulsen et al., 2011b). We 
presented children, adolescents, and adults with 
choices between a sure bet and a risky gamble with 
equal expected value while varying the disparity 
between the maximum and minimum rewards 
available for the gamble. For example, a trial with 
a low-risk gamble could present the chance of 
winning either 5 or 3 coins vs. a sure bet of 4 
coins, whereas a high-risk gamble could present 
the chance of winning either 8 or 0 coins. We used 
the coefficient of variation (CV), mathematically 
defined as the standard deviation divided by the 
mean, of the possible outcomes as our measure of 
economic risk for two reasons. First, because CV 
is a unitless measure of risk, it permits compari-
son between reward types and species. Second, 
CV has been demonstrated to be a better predic-
tor of choice behavior – accounting for greater 
behavioral variance in risk vs. sure bet choices – in 
humans and other animals than more traditional 
measures of risk like variance or standard devia-
tion (Weber et al., 2004). In our study, when CV 
was low, there were no group differences in risk-
taking between children, adolescents, and adults. 
As CV increased, however, age-related differences 
in choice emerged: children were mildly risk-
seeking, adolescents were mildly risk-averse, and 
adults were reliably risk-averse (Figure 1; Table 1).
contrIbutIons
Our findings make three important contributions 
to the growing literature on the development of 
risky decision-making. First, they underscore 
the need to distinguish between different types 
of risk-taking. While economic risk tasks allow 
experimental control and are frequently used 
to study risk-taking, there may be fundamental 
differences between this context and more natu-
ralistic risky decision-making situations such as 
whether to have unprotected sex, use illegal drugs, 
or drink and drive. Second, our findings suggest 
that the development of sensitivity to risk may 
be a major factor in the development of mature 
risk aversion. Third, our findings indicate devel-
opmental differences in how value is assessed. We 
next consider each of these factors in turn.
real-world vs. economIc rIsk
Although real-world risks de facto entail economic 
risk, a general distinction is often made between 
behaviors like substance use, extreme sporting, 
and delinquency, that may have longer lasting 
and less recoverable real-world consequences than 
Figure 1 | Children, adolescents, and adults, were presented with the choice between accepting risky gambles 
at varying levels of risk and taking a sure bet. The figure shown here illustrates that risk-seeking declined with age, 
and was modulated by level of risk. With increasing risk, children were risk-seeking, while adults and adolescents were 
risk-averse.
Risk aversion
The tendency to prefer certain over 
risky options. Risk aversion is most 
clearly identified when the certain and 
risky options under consideration have 
the same average or expected value.
Coefficient of variation (CV)
Mathematically defined as the standard 
deviation of outcome values divided by 
the mean. In our tasks, CV of outcomes 
is used as a measure of risk. Note that 
this definition works for values that are 
either all positive or all negative.
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Real-world risk-taking shows a different devel-
opmental trajectory from economic risk-taking, 
which could be due to any of a number of reasons. 
Health statistics show increased mortality in ado-
lescents due to preventable causes like drug abuse 
and driving under the influence of alcohol (Eaton 
et al., 2006; Karch et al., 2009), suggesting that 
real-world risk-taking has a curvilinear, inverted 
U-shaped pattern from childhood through adoles-
cence and into adulthood. One contributing factor 
to this pattern could be that adolescents are very 
sensitive to the influence of their peers (Lewis and 
Lewis, 1984; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Chein 
et al., 2010). Adolescent delinquency, one form of 
risk-taking, may reflect attempts to establish adult-
like independence (Moffitt, 1993). Another pos-
sibility is that adolescents’ heightened subjective 
estimate of their own control over situational vari-
ables may lead them to take greater risks (Weber 
and Milliman, 1997; Reyna and Farley, 2006).
Some authors have suggested that the ampli-
fied emotional volatility and/or mood fluctua-
tions associated with adolescence (Buchanan 
et al., 1992) may influence decisions in contexts 
involving risk (Burnett, et al., 2010; Figner, et al., 
2009), perhaps due to an affective focus on 
reward which overshadows attention to losses. 
Adolescents may also just think less before acting 
(Steinberg, 2004) or act impulsively (Steinberg 
et al., 2009). Heightened emotions and impul-
sivity might also work together to increase risk-
taking by promoting action before the potential 
negative consequences of actions have been fully 
considered. Endorsing this idea, the neural mech-
anisms responsible for impulse control take time 
to mature, after sensitivity to reward has already 
emerged (Galvan et al., 2006; Casey et al., 2008). 
Thus, based solely on the findings from research 
on real-world risk-taking, our results would not 
have been predicted, showing that not all types of 
risk are appreciated equally across age, and that 
the distinction between different kinds of risk is 
an important one to make.
development of rIsk-sensItIvIty
Our findings also suggest that risk-sensitivity 
changes across childhood and adolescence. We 
the behaviors elicited by laboratory gaming tasks. 
These two general types of risk-taking may be dis-
tinguished in several ways. One is by domain. For 
example, decision-research suggests that individual 
risk preference depends on situational variables, 
like whether the risk involved is recreational, social, 
health-related, or financial (Weber et al., 2002). A 
person who appears risk-seeking in their physical 
activities may be risk-averse in their investments, 
although mediating factors like perceived control 
over a situation or the perceived risk involved may 
reduce apparent discrepancies to a common risk-
attitude (Weber and Milliman, 1997).
A second dimension in which these two types 
of decisions differ is the heightened emotionality 
and greater potential for serious consequences 
in real-word as opposed to laboratory gambling. 
Real-world decisions can lead to financial success 
or ruin, physical elation or injury, psychologi-
cal pleasure or addiction, and social rejection or 
adulation. A handful of studies have attempted to 
explicitly manipulate the emotionality of decision-
making in laboratory risk-taking tasks for example 
by providing feedback (Burnett, et al., 2010; Figner, 
et al., 2009), or by having peers present during 
decision-making (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005).
A third way to distinguish real-world risk from 
economic risk involves a distinction between risk 
and ambiguity (Knight, 1921; Huettel et al., 2006). 
To understand this distinction, compare the prob-
ability of rolling “6” on a fair die (risk) with the 
probability of being in an auto accident (ambi-
guity). In the case of a die, the probability distri-
bution for different outcomes is fully specified, 
whereas the probability of a car crash is dependent 
on a multitude of contextual factors. With risk, all 
possible outcomes and their exact probabilities are 
known prior to making a decision. With ambigu-
ity, such information about outcomes is incom-
plete: road and weather conditions, the experience 
of other drivers, the frequency of wildlife cross-
ings, and the physical state of car and driver, can 
all make unknown contributions to the likelihood 
of an accident. Thus while many real-world “risk-
taking” decisions involve ambiguity, laboratory 
gambling tasks, including our own, involve risks 
that are more concretely defined.
Table 1 | Proportion risky choices by age group and coefficient of variation.
 Coefficient of variation
 0.35 0.71 1.06 1.41
Child 0.623 0.718 0.770 0.703
Adolescent 0.686 0.705 0.443 0.391
Adult 0.539 0.372 0.173 0.167
Risk
Uncertainty when possible outcomes 
and their probability of occurrence are 
known. For example, each face of a 
fair-sided die has a 0.166 probability of 
landing face-up. Betting on the 
outcome of a roll is risky.
Ambiguity
Uncertainty when information about 
possible outcomes and probability is 
incomplete or missing. For example, a 
used automobile has high mileage and 
an unknown history of owners. 
Expecting this car to last 5-years with 
only the given information is full of 
ambiguity.
Risk-sensitivity
Sensitivity to changes in degree of risk, 
indicated by changes in behavior or 
preference.
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comes of a gamble, with younger individuals put-
ting more focus on the jackpot, less focus on the 
loss, or both, compared to adults.
Another factor that may change over devel-
opment is the inherent preference for the nov-
elty or uncertainty of gambles. Prior research 
has shown that in monkeys the gamble itself 
has inherent value (Hayden et al., 2008). Several 
lines of research have found novelty-seeking to 
be particularly elevated during adolescence (see 
Spear, 2000, for review). However, many studies 
operationalize novelty-seeking as exploration of 
novel environments, and similar to the distinction 
between real-world and economic risk-taking, 
there may be differences between exploration 
and gambling related novelty-seeking. From this, 
the value of novel or uncertain outcomes com-
pared to predictable outcomes may have a differ-
ent developmental trajectory, namely decreasing 
with age. Consistent with this idea, although there 
was no significant difference between age groups 
in the probability of choosing the gamble when 
it was low-risk, children and adolescents showed 
an overall preference for the risky option, while 
adults did not. Future work will be needed to test 
these hypotheses, and to better separate novelty-
seeking, exploration, and risk-taking, from one 
another.
Much decision-making research has focused 
on how gambles are appraised, that is to say 
the valuation stage of decision-making, and 
less on how the assessment of outcomes relates 
to future decisions (see Rangel et al., 2008, for 
discussion of decision-making stages). Age-
related differences in outcome evaluation and 
learning could also contribute to the patterns 
we observed. For example, regret, an important 
mediator of decision-making, develops slowly 
between childhood and adulthood (Habib et al., 
2012). Neuroimaging work using the same task 
we focused on here found that the hippocam-
pus, amygdala, and insula, among other regions, 
increased in activation with age during decision-
making (Paulsen et al., 2011a). Both hippocam-
pal and amygdalar regions contribute to learning 
and memory, while the insula is thought to inte-
grate affective and cognitive information dur-
ing decision-making (Preuschoff et al., 2008). 
Learning from outcomes tends to improve with 
development (e.g., Crone and van der Molen, 
2004). Taken together, these ideas lead to the 
hypothesis that adults may be more adept at 
incorporating the outcomes of prior decisions 
into subsequent decision-making contexts. 
Future studies will need to explore this hypoth-
esis further.
found that while children prefer greater CVs, 
adolescents and adults found greater CVs aver-
sive. This pattern of behavior indicates a posi-
tive correlation between risk-taking and CV in 
children, and a negative correlation in adulthood. 
The transition during development from a posi-
tive to a negative slope between risk preference 
and the CV of a gamble implies a time period 
when the risk of a gamble has no predictive 
power on choice behavior. Given the hypothesis 
of competing processes in risk-taking behavior 
(Steinberg, 2010) – e.g., impulsivity vs. self-con-
trol and reward-seeking vs. loss-aversion – such 
indifference to risk suggests a period of balance 
between two or more processes involved in eco-
nomic risk-taking. Knowing when this period 
of balance occurs can inform our understand-
ing of the impact of other associated neural and 
cognitive changes in development (e.g., executive 
function, temporal discounting, etc.). Ongoing 
work suggests that the cross-over from risk-
seeking to risk-averse behavior occurs between 
7.5 and 13 years of age (Paulsen et al., 2012). In 
addition, this information indicates that children 
younger than 8-years-old will provide data piv-
otal to identifying the development of decision-
making under risk.
valuatIon and evaluatIon
Apart from sensitivity to risk, the fact that gam-
bles typically become less attractive as individuals 
age may also indicate developmental differences 
in how value is assessed. One possibility is that 
value is derived from the quantifiable properties 
of the gamble, like magnitude and probability, or 
through an interaction between these objective 
measures and how they are perceived. For exam-
ple, in Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992), the value of a gamble is formed 
as the summed product of individually weighted 
probabilities and individually weighted values. 
Greater attention to one or another outcome 
modulates these weightings (Lopes, 1995): focus-
ing more on gains yields an optimistic weighting 
and hence greater value, while focusing more on 
losses yields a pessimistic weighting and hence 
lesser value. Evidence in favor of this effect of 
attention comes jointly from behavioral differ-
ences in children and adult’s behavior in gain and 
loss domains (Weller, et al., 2010; Paulsen et al., 
2012) and from eye-tracking studies showing that 
the amount of time spent looking at a particular 
option is predictive of its being chosen among 
alternatives (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Thus, 
it’s possible that children and adults differentially 
allocate attention to the winning and losing out-
Paulsen et al. Development of risk preference
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could influence the design of interventions that 
could help to preclude or ameliorate the harmful 
consequences of risk-taking during development.
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conclusIon
The findings in Paulsen et al. (2011b) suggest a 
more gradual emergence of risk aversion over 
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